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Abstract. State fragility is a concept that emerged among the international community of donors 
in order to adapt aid policies to particularly difficult situations. Fragility has thus been measured 
to design a special treatment in favour of fragile states, otherwise left behind. In this context, but 
somewhat paradoxically, fragility has been measured by a low policy and institutional 
assessment, operated through the “CPIA”, in the multilateral development banks that also used 
this index as the major indicator to determine their aid allocation. Some other more 
multidimensional measures have broadened the scope of the indicators used to identify fragility. 
All these measures appear to be rather subjective, unstable, leading to discordant lists of fragile 
states and not really representing a risk to fail. 
For analytical and operational reasons, there may be advantages of turning to the concept of 
structural economic vulnerability (apparently close, but strongly different). Structural economic 
vulnerability, the risk to be durably affected by exogenous shocks, depends both on the size of the 
shocks and on the exposure to the shocks. It can be measured by the Economic Vulnerability 
Index (EVI), set up at the UN to identify the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). It is a rather 
objective and stable index, also reflecting a risk of becoming a fragile state, as illustrated by the 
fact that most of the LDCs have been considered as fragile at least once. Such an index can be 
used as a positive criterion of aid allocation, besides the CPIA, a low income per capita and a 
low level of human capital. Its inclusion among aid allocation criteria is supported by equity, 
effectiveness and transparency reasons. It allows one to treat the case of fragile states in an 
integrated framework, leaving only the most acute cases of fragility or failure for an exceptional 











1. Introduction: the fragility concept in retrospect 
 
Concepts have a history, and fragility has one. Before becoming the fashioned notion it is now, 
with multiple definitions, meanings and few measurements, state fragility has appeared as a 
political response to an operational issue. The history of the (state) fragility notion is linked to the 
design of aid policies, the measurement of fragility to the issue of aid allocation.  
 
When the notion of fragile states emerged 
 
A kind of international recognition of the notion of “fragile states” appeared in 2005 when the 
Development Aid Committee of the OECD organized two high level meetings on these states 
defined as “a lack of political commitment and insufficient capacity to develop and implement 
pro-poor policies” (OECD/ DAC 2005). These meetings led to the constitution of a “fragile states 
group” within the DAC. One year before, US AID  (2004) published a white paper relying on a 
sharp distinction between stable and fragile states. In 2005, it published a strategy paper on 
fragile states (US AID, 2005), as did DFID (2005)1, and then other bilateral donors (for instance 
France, Comité Interministériel de la Coopération Internationale et du Développement 2007).  
 
This general acceptance of the notion of fragile states, not involving a unique content, met 
previous concerns among donors about development effectiveness and security challenges 
(Daviron and Giordano, 2007). DAC had to address the issue of “difficult partnerships”. The US 
administration, and US AID in particular, had to face the problem of “failed states,” “failing 
states” and “state failure”. DFID had focused on “difficult environments” for poverty reduction 
(Torres and Anderson 2004). And from 2002, the World Bank used the even more influent notion 
of the Low Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS). They were low-income countries with a low 
rating of their policy and institutions. Although referring to countries rather than states, the 
LICUS category has opened the path to fragility measurement.       
 
 Why measurement became necessary 
 
Multilateral development banks, and in particular the World Bank, use a formula called 
“performance based allocation” (PBA) to allocate their assistance, where the aid to be allocated 
                                                 
1
 Definition by DFID (2005) is close to that of DAC: “the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the 
majority of its people.”  




to each eligible country depends dominantly on its policy and governance, as well as on its 
population size and (secondarily) on the (low) level of its income per capita2. This principle was 
supported by the works initiated at the Bank, according to which aid was more effective in 
countries pursuing “good policies”. The quality of policy and institutions was measured by the 
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) or a similar composite indicator, possibly 
also called CPIA (for instance at the African Development Bank), leading to various but highly 
correlated CPIAs3.                                                                                                                                                  
 
When it appeared clear that countries facing particularly difficult situations could not receive 
much from the PBA, although they could need more, the answer was then to give them a specific 
treatment for effectiveness or security reasons. Fragile states were first identified, by one way or 
another, as countries where the PBA should not apply. The resulting paradox has been that, while 
the aid allocation per capita was normally increasing with the CPIA, it was no longer the case for 
very low levels of CPIA, since fragile states were countries with quite a low CPIA.  
 
Wording has changed over time. The initial set of the Low Income Countries Under Stress 
(LICUS), identified in 2002 from a CPIA lower than 2.5, has been succeeded by a larger World 
Bank definition of fragile states, referring to higher thresholds adapted over time. In the last 
documents, the Bank, although still using the category, no longer uses it for aid allocation, 
preferring a narrower category of “Post Conflict Countries” (PCCs) to this aim. PCCs, still a 
heterogeneous category, since they include a country  such as Afghanistan, that one would like 
indeed to be post conflict, have thus become a sub-group of fragile states, in which the policy is 
assessed through a specific index to determine their allocation. Other institutions did not follow 
the same direction: for instance, the African Development Bank initially used the category of post 
conflict as an amendment to the Performance Base Allocation (PBA) rule, and now refers to 
fragile states, without much change in the number of countries concerned. 
 
As a result, due to the emphasis put on the CPIA, there has been a tendency to measure the 
fragility of states through a low level of this index, but with various thresholds, and also through 
specific or ad hoc categories, such as the Post Conflict Countries.  
                                                 
2
 In the “PBA” a major weight is given not only to the CPIA, but also in the CPIA, to its cluster D, more related to 
governance. An assessment of the Bank portfolio is also taken into account. 
3
 Since 2005, the World Bank has called IDA Resource Allocation Index (IRAI) the index corresponding to the 
CPIA when it is used for determining aid allocation to IDA eligible countries. Since there is no conceptual difference 
between the two indices, we still use the word of CPIA. 
. 





How the scope of fragility broadened, not easing its measurement  
 
Since it could be too restrictive to limit the assessment of fragility to the measurement of the 
CPIA, even if this one has an average of sixteen components (Annex1), several works have 
recently  presented a more complex or diversified view of fragile states, and fragility of states as 
well, without necessarily an operational purpose. Noticeably, a UNU-WIDER project on 
“Fragility and development”, leading to numerous papers, has simultaneously explored the 
dimensions of household vulnerability and state fragility in development, bringing inter alia, “an 
economic perspective to the concept and classification of fragile states” (Naudé et al. 2008), and 
including various papers addressing measurement issues4. Another example of a multidisciplinary 
approach can be given by the book Etats et sociétés fragiles published under the direction of 
Châtaigner and Magro (2007), where some quantitative insights can be found. More recently, the 
OECD DAC  (2008) has published a short book on Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in 
Fragile Situations, which is the result of a study commissioned by the Fragile States Group and 
prepared by the Center on International Cooperation at New York University. The work proposes 
to modify the OECD /DAC definition of a fragile state, simply as “one unable to meet its 
population’s expectations or manage changes in expectations and capacity through the political 
process.” Under the heading of a “dynamic concept,” fragility is said to reside “at the opposite 
side of resilience, which implies the ability to cope with change while maintaining the bargain of 
the social contract” (p18). Maybe as a counterpart of this so-called dynamic approach (and of the 
reference to resilience), the book, which contains rich developments, does not include any 




How fragility is distinguished from vulnerability, specifically measured 
 
Moving from the category of fragile states to an examination of the state fragility by itself, 
sometimes of the “fragility of the societies” (eg Châtaigner and Magro, 2007), could lead to meet 
the notion of economic vulnerability. Economic vulnerability is a concept used at the 
macroeconomic level (country vulnerability), as well as at the household one. And it is  likely to 
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 In particular Steward and Brown, Carment et al. considered below. 




be measured, indeed more or less adequately.  Fragility and vulnerability are apparently close, but 
in fact strongly different concepts according to the present literature, each with its own history, as 
explained above for fragility and below for vulnerability. A first etymologic distinction could be 
made between fragility, which is a risk to be broken, and vulnerability, which is a risk to be 
affected or wounded. The second and more substantive difference, resulting from the use of the 
words, is the fact that fragility is mainly related to the state, its will and its capacity, while 
vulnerability at the macro level is related to the whole economy and its susceptibility to 
exogenous shocks. Of course there may be some overlapping of the two notions, as far as the 
overall economic vulnerability partly depends on the capacity to cope with the shocks, or in other 
words, on the resilience. 
 
If we consider  the structural vulnerability that depends only on factors beyond the present will of 
the country, the distinction becomes sharper.  Consequently the assessment of fragility involves 
more subjective judgment than the assessment of vulnerability, at least of structural vulnerability, 
making its measurement more debatable. Finally, it might be considered that fragility, because it 
is linked to political variables, corresponds to a more transitory or reversible situation than the 
structural economic vulnerability, except in that they both depend, to some extent, on the 
development level. Paul Collier (2007), who uses the concept of failing states, for “those low 
income countries that are below the cut-off for governance and economic policies,” underlines 
how often “the rating crashed and then rapidly rebounded.” 
 
Considering successively “state fragility” and “structural economic vulnerability” may help to 
examine the relevance of the indicators of one and the other. However, it is not enough to fairly 
assess state fragility. If state fragility is influenced by structural economic vulnerability, then 
assessment of the latter may contribute to that of the former. 
 
This is why the two next sections are respectively devoted to the measures of state fragility and 











2. Measurements of state fragility and their limitations  
 
Following the brief historical perspective presented above, it is easy to distinguish two different 
approaches in the quantitative assessment of fragility, i.e. the assessment by the means of indices. 
One relies on the assessment of policy and institutional performance through a single (composite) 
index, the CPIA or a similar index. The second one is more multidimensional and relies on 
several indices, covering different features of the country. 
  
Fragility measured from a policy and institutional assessment  
 
It is natural that the first approach has been mainly used in the perspective of aid allocation as far 
as some transparency was sought, in particular in the multilateral development banks. As seen 
above, the policy and institutional performance has been the main aid allocation criterion for 
these banks, what could leave behind poor countries in a particularly difficult situation and 
greatly needing assistance. The assessment has been implemented at two levels. The first one is 
the identification of a large set of “fragile states” and the second one is the determination of the 
eligibility to supplementary financing.  
 
Identifying fragile states from the CPIA 
 
Fragile states are generally defined as states that lack the capacity and/or willingness to perform 
the basic functions of the state (maintaining security, enable economic development, ensuring 
essential needs of the population) (OECD 2008). That can indeed be understood in a narrow or 
broad manner.The will and capacity are supposed to be adequately captured by the CPIA 
(Country Policy and Institutional Assessment). The reference to the CPIA has been the first and 
main practice to identify the fragile states. The CPIA rates countries against a set of 16 criteria 
grouped into four clusters: (a) economic management; (b) structural policies; (c) policies for 
social inclusion and equity; and (d) public sector management and institutions (see Annex 1). 
  
The World Bank first used this home index with a threshold of 2.5 when it designed the LICUS 
category, and then applied a threshold of 3 for the preparation of IDA 14, enhanced to 3.2 for 
IDA 15. In this framework, fragile states are low-income countries with a CPIA below a certain 
threshold, which means with poor policies and weak institutions.  
 




It is also with reference to an absolute CPIA threshold that Chauvet and Collier (2006, 2007) 
define what they call “failing states”. Chauvet and Collier (2006) define the failing states as 
countries having had a CPIA lower than a threshold of 2.5 during four consecutive years or an 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) lower than 47.7 (on a scale of 0 to 100) that generates 
the same proportion of fragile states. It appears from their data that, between 1970 and 2004, 51 
states have been considered failing at least once. 
 
A close measure was adopted for statistical reasons by the fragile states group of the DAC, as 
well as by DFID, still referring to the World Bank CPIA. But fragile states are located within the 
two bottom quintiles of the CPIA (set of IDA eligible countries): the fragile states were thus 
designed as a relative category, with respect to a relative, then moving threshold instead of with 
respect to an absolute threshold. By definition, forty percent of the IDA eligible are always 
considered as fragile, what may seem debatable5. However the corresponding threshold of the 
CPIA is approximately the same as the enhanced absolute threshold of the World Bank (3.2). 
 
The Asian Development Bank (ADB), although not having a formal policy for fragile states 
similarly identifies them, also called “Weak Performers Countries”, by a ranking in the two 
bottom quintiles of a Country Performance Assessment (CPA) (for two of the most recent years) 
or when a country is considered to be in conflict or recovering from conflict and thus fragile 
(ADB 2009). To be noted, the CPA takes the quality of its portfolio projects into account in 
addition to the CPIA.   
 
Determining the eligibility of fragile states to supplementary financing and the allocation of the 
latter: fragility assessed again 
 
The identification of fragile states by the World Bank, as just indicated, does not necessarily 
involve access to supplementary finance, but only some attention, presence, monitoring and 
warning. Otherwise, it would contradict the principle of the ‘performance based allocation” that 
relies on the idea that aid is more effective in countries with good policies. But as evidenced by 
                                                 
5
 In March 2009, DAC informally referred to a different definition, relying on three classifications: they were 
retained as fragile states countries either within the CPIA two bottom quintiles (of IDA eligible), they were within 
the bottom quintile of Brookings Institution index of state weakness (set up for 141 countries) or  they were among 
the “weak states” of the list of countries established by the Carleton University  country indicators of foreign policy 
(CIFP)  (see infra).  




Collier et al. (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004), aid can be supposed  highly effective in 
post-conflict situations. 
 
 Initially the LICUS status gave access to a special trust fund. Access to supplementary finance is 
given to a narrower sub-group, the “post conflict” countries. For the determination of this group 
of particularly fragile countries, criteria are less clear-cut. The criteria refer to the damages 
caused by the conflict (human casualty, population displacement, physical destruction) and to 
conditions for efficient involvement of the Bank, related to the domestic political situation and 
prospects (reduction of conflict, expectations of stability, government counterpart) and to 
evidence of international cooperation. In addition to these post conflict countries, there are a 
(IDA 14) few “reengaging countries” that without having experienced severe conflict have 
known an extended period of IDA inactivity. At the end, the inclusion needs a political choice, 
which may lead to some heterogeneity in the small set of countries retained (presently eight 
countries, including Afghanistan) (see Annex 3).  
 
The same applies to the eligibility of the fragile states facility at the African Development Bank, 
where ipso facto fragile states are identified as a narrow group, as is the post conflict group at the 
World Bank. Countries declared eligible to a “supplemental financing window” meet two-stage 
criteria: (1) commitment to peace and security and key socioeconomic needs indicators; (2) 
commitment to an improvement in macroeconomic conditions and pursuit of sound debt policy 
and financial management practices6. The other (five) fragile countries experiencing marked 
deterioration in performance due to conflict and crisis can have access to a “Targeted Support 
Window” dedicated to technical assistance activities and service delivery to non-sovereigns. 
Presently, only nine countries are published on the list countries having access to the first 
window,  all being fragile states in the World Bank broad meaning, but only two being in the 
World Bank group of post-conflict (Burundi and Democratic Republic of Congo, see Annex 3), 
although most of the seven other countries could also be considered in a situation of post-conflict.    
 
Once the eligibility for special financing is determined, its amount is still to be calculated and 
here quantitative assessment of fragility is again needed. The less fragile the fragile country, the 
more it should receive, so that the allocation comes back to the PBA principle. In other words, the 
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 These countries can also have access under special conditions to the Arrears Clearance Window. 




country receives an allocation according to a country policy assessment (CPA)7. At the African 
Development Bank, the supplemental allocation under ADF 11 is a multiple of the country 
allocation under ADF 10, which itself depended on the previous CPA. At the WB, a specific 
index is applied, the “Post Conflict Performance Indicators” (PCPI), a kind of CPIA for the most 
fragile. It also includes four clusters, each with three items (see annex 2): (A) security and 
reconciliation; (B) economic recovery; (C) social inclusion and social sector development; (D) 
public sector management and institutions. Its specificity is essentially in cluster A, reflecting 
security, reconciliation and disarmament, which is, of course, crucial in a post-conflict situation, 
and one item of cluster (C), the reintegration of displaced populations. Other items are similar to 
those that can be found in the CPIA. In early 2009, a panel of external experts convened to 
review the methodology and the process of the PCPI recommended to “differentiate between the 
criteria used to assess performance in post-conflict countries and those used for the remaining 
countries, while preserving to the extent possible a common set of elements.” It would entail  
having a set of three (or four) clusters in common with the CPIA, and another fourth (or fifth) 
cluster dedicated to specific aspects of recovery in post-conflict situations.  
 
Fragility measured from multiple criteria 
 
Another quantitative approach of state fragility is  starting from several criteria of fragility that 
are likely to represent different features of fragile states, each of which is measured by an index. 
This approach has been illustrated by a Canadian team working for the Foreign Affairs Ministry 
(CIFP 2006, Carment, Prest and Samy, 2008). They identify three main dimensions of fragility: 
authority failure, service entitlement failure and legitimacy failure. Then from 75 indicators 
pooled in 6 clusters they both calculate a synthetic index and identify a group of fragile states. 
Their classification has been informally retained by the DAC in March 2009 as one of three 
substitutable reference lists used to identify fragile states. The two other lists include the 
traditional list set up according to the two bottom quintiles of the CPIA (of IDA eligible 
countries) and the bottom quintile of the “Indicator State Weakness” of the Brookings Institution 
(2008), another multidimensional index that is itself an average of five clusters (economic, 
political, security, social welfare, GNI per capita), set up for 141 developing or transition 
economies.. 
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 The CPA (World Bank acronym) is an average of the four clusters of the CPIA (giving a major weight to the cluster 
D) and of a country portfolio rating. 




The same three dimensions of authority, service entitlement and legitimacy have been retained by 
Stewart and Brown (2009) in a broad study on the characterization of fragile states. For each of 
the three dimensions, indicators are defined. According to the level of these indicators, states that 
are considered as fragile are classified either as “failed” or as “at risk”. Authority failures are 
measured from civil conflict and violence, service entitlement failures from human development 
outcomes (child mortality rate, primary enrolment rate, provision of improved water) and 
legitimate government failure from level of democracy and level of autocracy (Polity IV). The 
list of IDA eligible countries considered as failing or at risk, according to each dimension of 
fragility, is given in annex 3.  It is striking that there is little correlation between the three 
dimensions of fragility. No country is failing according to the three dimensions and only three 
according to two dimensions (Burundi, Democratic republic of Congo and Myanmar).8  
 
In these conditions it would make little sense to aggregate the three dimensions in a composite 
index and the multi-criteria analysis cannot provide a guideline for aid allocation. However this 
analysis can be useful to determine the best ways to help states  move away from fragility 
depending on its source. 
 
Fragility of the measurements of fragility        
  
The table in Annex 3, even if the lists of the various columns are not rigorously comparable due 
to discrepancies in the period of observation, suggests a large variety in the contents of the 
category of fragile states, and the fragility of the category itself. 
  
Subjectivity in the choice of index components 
 
A common limitation of the various measures examined is their subjectivity. This subjectivity is 
involved by the concept of fragility, which relies on an assessment of economic and social 
policies and institutions: these are complex matters where a consensus does not always exist. The 
CPIA, which is the main indicator used to assess fragility, has often been criticized for this reason 
                                                 
8
 There are other attempts of establishing synthetic indices of state fragility from a list of a priori components, as 
listed in Rice and Patrick (2008), for instance the “State Fragility Index” of  George Mason University (Marshall and 
Gladstone, 2007),  the Mo Ibrahim Fondation “Index of African Governance” (2007),  or or the “Failed State Index” 
of Foreign Policy, 2008, to which we come back below. 




and attempts to improve it have remained limited9 (see for instance Kanbur, 2005, Lafourcade, 
2007, Minson,2007, for the conclusions of a seminar organized by the Initiative for Policy 
Dialogue, and Steets,2008). 
 
Another analytical weakness includes fragility measurements: because they essentially rely on a 
judgment of policies, they are unstable and do not really reflect the risk to fail that also depends 
on structural factors. As they are measured, fragile states are more often failed states than states at 
risk to fail. 
 
Is fragility as a specific risk measurable? 
 
 A logical definition of fragility (and fragile states) should rely on an estimation of a risk to fail. 
To estimate such a risk, there should first be an agreement on what is failure: is failure a 
continuous or a discontinuous variable? Fragility suggests a discontinuity (risk to be broken), and 
is then difficult to identify. The clearest or utmost failure is civil conflict, the risk of which can be 
assessed on a continuous basis (by the number of battle deaths) or on a discontinuous basis (when 
the number of battle deaths is higher than a given threshold). Then there should be a good 
estimation of the function of the risk. As for the risk of a civil conflict, since the seminal paper of 
Collier and Hoeffler (1998), many estimations have been done, leading to a lively debate10. As 
for the broader risk of political instability, several attempts have been made to propose a 
corresponding index of fragility, without really leading to a consensus (see in particular the 
“Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger”, Hewitt et al., 2008,11). Anyway  it seems hardly 
conceivable to use such econometric estimations for aid allocation. 
 
Analytical weaknesses probably explain why, in spite of the huge attention given to the fragile 
state concept in international organizations, it has not really become an operational concept. We 
have seen that, after having defined fragile states, the World Bank prefers to use the post-conflict 
notion to give access to supplementary financing. The main potential use of the analysis of state 
fragility is rather to suggest orientations for the aid modalities in countries facing various kinds of 
difficult situations, as done by Chauvet and Collier (2006, 2007). 
                                                 
9
 There are also technical issues, such as those related to the shape of the distribution of the CPIA, which have led 
Baliamoune-Lutz and  McGillivray (2008) to measure “fuzzy” CPIA. 
10
 See the review of Raynal-Querol 2009, and the recent paper of Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner, 2009 
11
 The “Failed State Index” of Foreign Policy, 2008, ,already quoted above, relies on components that are likely to be 
be “early warning and assessment” of a risk of internal conflict, but does not seem to rely on a formal model.   





3. Economic vulnerability versus state fragility 
 
In order to obtain a more objective and more operational measure of fragility, it is conceivable to 
turn to the notion of vulnerability. For a long time, this concept has drawn the attention of 
economists and the international community as well. Nearly fifteen years ago, and repeatedly, 
UN conferences have expressed the wish for an index reflecting the vulnerability of the 
economies, in particular the small ones (Guillaumont 2006, 2009). After having recalled the 
meaning of the concept of economic vulnerability, we analyze its links with that of fragility. We 
draw some consequences of the fragility measurement. Operational implications for aid policy 
are finally underlined.  
 
Concept and measurement of vulnerability  
 
Three dimensions of vulnerability 
 
The economic vulnerability of a country can be defined by the risk for (poor) countries to see 
their development hampered by the shocks they face, natural or external. Two main kinds of 
exogenous shocks are the main sources of vulnerability: 1) “natural” shocks, namely natural 
disasters, such as earthquakes or volcanic eruptions, and the more frequent climatic shocks, such 
as typhoons and hurricanes, droughts, floods, etc; 2) external (trade and exchange related) shocks, 
such as slumps in external demand, world commodity prices instability (and correlated instability 
of terms of trade) etc. Other domestic shocks may also be generated by political instability, or 
more generally by unforeseen political changes, but they cannot be considered as exogenous in 
the same way. 
 
            Vulnerability can be seen as the result of three components: (a) the size and frequency of 
the exogenous shocks; (b) the exposure to the shocks, that depends on the size, the location and 
the structure of the economy; (c) the capacity to react to the shocks, or “resilience” (Guillaumont 
2006, 2008b). The resilience is more dependent on the current policy, more easily reversible and 
less structural. However (even more clearly at the micro level than at the macro level) resilience 
may also depend on ex ante conditions, such as the administrative structure and the inherited 




fiscal space, limiting the set of available policies.12 A way to address this issue would be to 
consider these ex ante conditions among the determinants of exposure to the shocks. 
 
 Regardless, a distinction can be made between structural vulnerability, which results from 
factors that are durably independent from the current political will of countries, and the 
vulnerability deriving from current policy, which results from present choices. If a vulnerability 
index is to be used for selecting certain countries and providing them with a durable support by 
the international community, the vulnerability to be measured is the structural one, which 
essentially results from the size of the shocks that can arise from the exposure to such shocks, and 
from the structural components of resilience, as far as they can be distinguished from the 
structural aspects of exposure. 
 
The measurement of structural vulnerability 
 
While the resilience could be measured to some extent by policy and institutional indicators, such 
as the CPIA and the other indices considered in the previous section, the structural economic 
vulnerability should be captured by a specific index. We primarily refer to the Economic 
Vulnerability Index (EVI), a composite index set up at the Committee for Development Policy 
(CDP) of the UN for the identification of the Least Developed Countries, applied first in 2000 
and revised in 2006. We refer to this index not only because it has been officially used, but also 
because, compared to other attempts to build an economic vulnerability index, it is supposed to 
only correspond to the structural determinant of vulnerability. Moreover, it refers to a logical 
framework combining shock indicators and exposure indicators. 
 
The present EVI is a composite index calculated from seven component indices, made up of four 
shock indices and three exposure indices. Using an arithmetic averaging, equal weight is given to 
the sum of the shock indices and the sum of the exposure indices. In the shock indices, equal 
weight is given to natural and external shocks, while in the exposure indices equal weight is 
given to population size and to the total of other indices. Naturally, there are several other ways, 
some possibly more logical, how these component indices could be weighted and averaged, in 
particular with regard to the interaction between the size of the shocks and the exposure to them 
(Guillaumont 2006, 2008). The method adopted in EVI by the CDP has been chosen for reasons 
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 An anonymous referee is to be acknowledged for this point. 




of simplicity and transparency. The components of the EVI have been retained so that they reflect 
the main channels through which structural vulnerability affects growth potential. The 
components of the EVI are as follows (respective weights are given between brackets): 
     
- size of shocks:  
- external shocks: instability of goods and services exports, measured as the squared 
relative deviation from a trend value estimated from a time variable and the lagged 
endogenous variable (“mixed “ trend)   (0.125);  
- natural shocks:  
           - agricultural production instability, measured by the same method as the 
                   export instability ( 0.0625); 
                - percent of population displaced by natural disasters, as obtained from the 
Emergengy Disasters Data Base produced by the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of 
Disasters (CRED) (0.0625)13. 
 
   - exposure to shocks:  
- population size (in log), index taken in the opposite direction (0.25),  
- distance from world markets, an index calculated at CERDI, corresponding to the 
minimum average distance to reach a significant amount (50%) of the world market, 
adjusted for the degree in which the countries are landlocked (0.125);  
- concentration of goods exports, as calculated by UNCTAD (Hirschman index) 
(0.0625); 
-  and relative share of value added in agriculture, forestry, and fishing activities; 
 
Links between economic vulnerability and state fragility 
 
Fragility as resilience 
 
The state fragility as previously defined can be seen as a weak resilience, even if the analysis of 
fragility hardly makes reference to shocks. A recent OECD document quoted above considers 
“resilience”, defined as the capacity to cope with difficulties, as the dynamic opposite of fragility, 
                                                 
13
 A detailed analysis of the EVI is presented in Guillaumont (2008b, and 2009). 
 




but without any measurement attempt (OECD 2005). Designed as the opposite of the resilience, 
state fragility is clearly distinct from structural economic vulnerability.    
 
Fragility resulting from structural vulnerability 
 
However the notion of fragility should reflect the risk for a country to fail, rather than the fact 
that it has actually failed. In that perspective, the state fragility depends on the structural 
vulnerability, which makes the latter a partial and indirect measure of the fragility. Shocks and 
exogenous sources of instability are factors of economic and social deterioration. Not only are 
they factors of slower growth, but also factors of durable impoverishment (generating poverty 
traps), social unrest, criminality and civil wars (see a review in Guillaumont 2006, 2008).  More 
generally, they make a good policy management and effective state building more difficult.  
 
An illustration of the link between structural vulnerability and state fragility may be given by the 
relationship between the measure of structural vulnerability by EVI and the CPIA. According to 
the provisional results of an on-going study with M. Gillivray and L. Wagner, using a panel 
model, and retrospective estimates of EVI, the level of CPIA seems very significantly affected by 
the level of EVI (elasticity of around 0.27), and all the more,  the level of CPIA is weak (quintile 
regression). Among the components of EVI, the instability of exports has the stronger negative 
influence on the CPIA. 
 
The Least Developed Countries (LDCs) as fragile states   
 
In the literature on state fragility understood in a broad meaning as state weakness, it is often 
underlined that a low level of human capital and more generally of income per capita are durable 
factors of fragility14. If the major permanent factors of a risk to fail are the level of income per 
capita, the level of human capital and the structural economic vulnerability, it follows that the 
countries belonging to the category of the LDCs, precisely defined as countries meeting three 
corresponding criteria, are particularly at risk to fail. The table in Annex 3 illustrates the risk for 
an LDC to be classified as a fragile state in one way or another. The LDCs, which are the low 
income countries suffering the most of structural handicaps, identified through low level of 
human capital and high economic vulnerability, are also a group of fragile states. As it appears in 
                                                 
14
 As for the risk of civil conflict, the influence of the level of income, as opposed to its variation, is a matter of 
controversy (Raynal-Querol 2009)  




Annex 3, all the 49 LDCs except two (Maldives15 and Tuvalu) have been classified as fragile 
states at least once by at least one  fragile state classifications. 
 
Implications of a structural approach of fragility: back to aid allocation 
 
Turning to structural economic vulnerability, possibly by referring to EVI, helps to address the 
main criticisms of state fragility as previously defined. 
 
From an analytical point of view, the use of a structural indicator such as EVI (and indicators of 
the level of human capital as well) are less subjective and more stable than the opinions on the 
quality of policies and institutions. 
 
From an operational point of view, there is a rationale to introducing structural vulnerability and 
human capital in the aid allocation formula of the multilateral institutions. It would be a good 
way to address the issue of fragility, not only when the states have failed, but preventively. This 
new approach would be fully consistent with the principles that we believe should be followed 
for aid allocation: equity, effectiveness and transparency. 
 
Vulnerability as a structural handicap for which to be compensated 
 
The first principle is equity. It is poorly represented in the PBA by the per-capita income 
criterion, due to its assigned little weight. If equity corresponds to equal opportunities, the criteria 
should reflect the factors constituting structural growth handicaps for the country, in other words 
what factors beyond their control do not give them identical chances to grow (or to reach the 
Millennium Development Goals). To satisfy the principle of equity, aid should be allocated to 
compensate for structural handicaps. In that perspective, structural vulnerability (and low human 
capital) are to be taken into account. 
 
Structural vulnerability as a factor of aid effectiveness 
 
Where development aid is concerned, equity cannot be considered independently from 
effectiveness. To truly offset the handicaps involved, aid must be effective. Accordingly, the 
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 Maldives is to be graduated from the category in 2011. 




allocation criteria must reflect the factors that in the receiving countries influence the 
effectiveness of the aid they receive. The CPIA was initially incorporated into the PBA—as a 
presumed factor in performance—for that purpose. Our econometric calculations indicate 
structural vulnerability, especially export revenue instability, as a more robust factor that affects 
the aid effectiveness in terms of growth than policy or governance (Guillaumont and Chauvet 
2001)16: structural vulnerability increases the marginal effectiveness of aid, which corresponds to 
the fact that aid reduces the effects of vulnerability. In particular, aid has a stabilizing impact with 
regard to exports, which largely explains the contribution of aid to growth. In other words, the 
more aid allocated to vulnerable countries, the better it protects growth (or avoids negative 
growth). In the long term, aid helps make countries less economically vulnerable by promoting 
growth and the economic diversification that accompanies it (Guillaumont and Chauvet 2001, 
Chauvet and Guillaumont 2004, 2009 and for more micro evidence, Guillaumont and Laajaj 
2006). 
 
Structural vulnerability as a means to enhance transparency and consistency in aid allocation 
 
The third principle is transparency. Aid allocation among countries is a policy choice that should 
be easily understood by the authorities and public opinion in both North and South countries.  
 
Making vulnerability an aid allocation criterion may help enhance coherence and transparency in 
allocation. Using the criterion of vulnerability can help treat cases of fragile states without 
specifically having recourse to this category or a similar one, as an exception to the principle of 
performance-based allocation (PBA). In addition, the impact of poor policy and bad governance 
on aid allocation would be dampened as far as they result from structural vulnerability. 
Simulations, done using CPIA, GNI pc, EVI and HAI (Human Asset Index) with similar weights 
in a revised PBA formula, show that in this way target groups of countries, such as the World 
Bank fragile states or LICUS and the LDCs, receive a fair part of the aid volume (Guillaumont 
2008a). Improvements are conceivable following improvement in the CPIA itself and EVI as 
well.  
 
For these three reasons, it would seem that we could justify making structural vulnerability one of 
the main criteria for the development of aid allocation. While fragility can be treated in this way 
                                                 
16
 This higher robustness is confirmed by the comparative assessment of aid-growth regressions made by Roodman 
(2007) 




in an integrated framework, only the most acute situations of failure, essentially linked to civil 
war, should be treated as exceptional cases. 
  
It does not mean that, besides these exceptional situations of failure, the assessment of state 
fragility or weakness, does not have an important role to play in aid policy. It should be more of a 
factor for determining aid modalities, in particular the share of budgetary support, than a criterion 
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Annex 1: Definition of the World Bank CPIA 
 
The Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) rates countries against a set of 16 
criteria grouped into four clusters: (a) economic management; (b) structural policies; (c) policies 
for social inclusion and equity; and (d) public sector management and institutions. 
A. Economic Management 
1. Macroeconomic Management 
2. Fiscal Policy 
3. Debt Policy 
B. Structural Policies 
4. Trade 
5. Financial Sector 
6 Business Regulatory Environment 
C. Policies for Social Inclusion/Equity 
7. Gender Equality 
8. Equity of Public Resource Use 
9. Building Human Resources 
10. Social Protection and Labor 
11. Policies and Institutions for Environmental Sustainability 
D. Public Sector Management and Institutions 
12. Property Rights and Rule-based Governance 
13. Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management 
14. Efficiency of Revenue Mobilization 
15. Quality of Public Administration 
16. Transparency, Accountability, and Corruption in the Public Sector 
 




Annex 2: World Bank Post-Conflict Performance Indicators 
 
 
Cluster A: Security and Reconciliation 
Q1: Security 
Q2: Reconciliation 
Q3: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration 
 
Cluster B: Economic Recovery 
Q4: Fiscal and Monetary Policies, Debt, and Inflation 
Q5: Trade and Foreign Exchange Policies and Private Sector Environment 
Q6: Management and Sustainability of National Recovery Program 
 
Cluster C: Social Inclusion and Social Sector Development  
 Q7: Reintegration of Displaced populations 
Q8: Building Human Resources 
Q9: Social Cohesion, Non-Discrimination, and Human Rights 
 
Cluster D: Public Sector Management and Institutions  
Q10: Fiscal and Budgetary Management and Efficiency of Revenue 
Mobilization  
Q11: Reestablishing Public Administration and Rule-Based Governance  
































Annex 3 : Fragile States according to various definitions 
Stewart and Brown 
At risk x 

















































Afghanistan xx x x xx x   n.a. n.a. xx x 
Angola xx x x xx x  x xx x x x 
Azerbaijan         xx   
Bangladesh    x x  x    x 
Benin       x x   x 
Bhutan         xx  x 
Botswana            
Burkina Faso    x   x xx   x 
Burundi xx x x xx x xx x xx  xx x 
Cambodia x x x x   x x  x x 
Cameroon  x x x x   x x   
Cape Verde            
Central African 
Republic x x x xx x xx x xx  x x 
Chad x x x xx x  x xx   x 
Comoros x x x x x xx x    x 
Congo DR xx x x xx x xx x xx  xx x 
Congo Rep xx x x xx x  x  x x  
Cote d’Ivoire x x x xx x xx x x n.a. xx  
Djibouti x x x x x   x   x 
Dominica            
Eq Guinea  x  xx x  x xx x  x 
Eritrea xx x x xx x    xx  x 
Ethiopia  x  xx x  x x  x x 
Gambia x x x x    x x  x 
Georgia            
Guinea x x x xx x  x x   x 
Guinea Bissau x x x xx x xx x xx   x 
Guyana       x     
Haiti x x x xx x  x    x 
Indonesia       x   x  
Kenya  x  x x       
Kiribati  x x        x 
Lao PDR x x x x x  x  xx  x 
Lesotho    x   x    x 
Liberia x x  xx x xx x xx  x x 
Madagascar    x   x x   x 
Malawi    x    x   x 
Maldives           x 
Mali    x    xx   x 
Mauritania x x  x x  x  x  x 
Mozambique    x   x x   x 
Myanmar x x   x  x n.a. xx xx x 




Stewart and Brown 
At risk x 














































Nepal  x  xx x  x  x xx x 
Niger  x  xx x  x xx   x 
Nigeria x x  xx x  x xx  x  
Papua New Guinea x x  x        
Rwanda  x  xx x  x xx x x x 
Samoa           x 
Sao Tome and Principe x x x    x    x 
Senegal        x   x 
Sierra Leone x x x xx x xx x xx  x x 
Solomon Islands x x x x   x  n.a. x x 
Somalia x x  xx x  x n.a.  xx x 
Sudan x x x xx x  x  x x x 
Tajikistan  x x x   x  x   
Tanzania    x   x x   x 
Timor Leste xx x x        x 
Togo x x x xx x xx x x   x 
Tonga x x x         
Tuvalu           x 
Uganda  x  xx x  x x x x x 
Uzbekistan x x x x   x  xx   
Vanuatu x x x        x 
Yemen  x x x x       
Zambia    x   x x   x 
Zimbabwe x x x xx x  x  xx   
TOTAL 34 48 31 56 40 9 51 30 18 20 49 
 
 Source: 
(1):  World Bank FY 2007 including the Territory of Kosovo 
(2): International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) OECD-DAC 2009 including Iraq, North 
Korea, Pakistan and Palestinian Administration  
(3): IDA Resource Allocation Index (IRAI)  2006 on the World Bank website17 (quintiles calculated 
after adding to the list 3 inactive countries where CPIA is supposed to be at lowest levels: Liberia, 
Myanmar and Somalia) 
(4): Brookings Index of State Weakness in the Developing World 2008: two bottom quintiles (bottom 
quintile (xx) and second quintile (x)) of the index of state weakness including Burma, Colombia, East 
Timor, Iraq, North Korea, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Swaziland and Turkmenistan 
(5): Carleton University Country Indicators of Foreign Policy (CFIP) 2007 index including Iran, Iraq, 
North Korea, Pakistan, Palestinian Territories and Swaziland 
(6): AfDB 2008 
(7): Collier 2006 including 9 other middle-income countries (Albania, Egypt, Ghana, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Pakistan, Ukraine, Vietnam and Turkmenistan) 
(8): Stewart and Brown 2009, referring to various dates between 2000 and 2004 in absolute thresholds 
(9): DESA website: http://www.un.org/esa/policy/devplan/profile/ldc_list.pdf 



















Annex 4. Comparison of the contents of the main state fragility indicators 

































































































































































x x   x x x x    
Four clusters, 16 
indicators: a) economic 
management; (b) 
structural policies; (c) 
policies for social 
inclusion and equity; and 
(d) public sector 
management and 
institutions. 
Country classified as a 






x x x x   x x x x    
4 clusters, 16 indicators 





x x x x   x x x x    
World Bank’s CPIA  









x x x x   x x x x    
World Bank’s CPIA, 2 
bottom quintiles of IDA-
eligible countries 
















x x x x x x x x x   
Compilation of the World 
Bank's CPIA, the 
Brookings Index of state 
weakness and the Country 
indicators for Foreign 
Policy 
(cf below) 
































































































































































x x     x x x  x x x 
Overall ranking of 141 
countries. 5 indicators  in  
each basket. Within each 
basket, the indicator 
scores are standardized 
and aggregated, creating  
individual indicator and  
basket scores ranging 
from 0.0 (worst) to 10.0 
(best). The 4 basket scores 
are then  averaged  to 
obtain an overall score for 
state weakness, ranging 
from just above 0 to just 
short of a perfect 10, to 
produce a ranking of 
states on  the  basis of 
their relative weakness. 
Classification according 
to the quintiles. 
Carleton 
Universit

















x  x x x x x x x  x 
75 structural indicators 
























  x x    x x  x 
Threefold criteria: 
authority failures (Major 
Episodes of Political 
Violence dataset from the 
Centre for Systemic Peace 
(Marshall 2006)), service 
entitlements failures 
(provision of improved  
water  source, child  
mortality rates, and 
primary enrolment rates) 
and legitimate governance 
failures (Polity IV dataset 
scores). 79 countries. No 
ranking of countries but 
identification of countries 
failed and countries at 
risk. Distinction between 
absolute and progressive 
thresholds. 






































































































































































x x  x x x x x x  x 
5 categories: safety and 
security, rule of law. 
transparency and 
corruption, participation 
and human rights, 
sustainable economic 
opportunity and human 
development. 14 sub-
categories, 58 indicators 











x  x     x x  x 
One indicator for each 
gap: childhood 
immunization for 
capacity, voice and 
accountability for 
legitimacy and battle 
deaths for security. 
Identification of around 
50 fragile states 
Political  
Instabili
ty  Task  
Force 
(CIA)   





 x x  x  x x   x 
List of state failures 
events Focus only on 
severe state collapse, 
“severe internal political 
crisis” Relies on factors 
highly correlated with 
crises. 
 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.18 
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x   x x  x    x x x 
Employing about 16 
underlying  data sources, 
they generate 
effectiveness  and  
legitimacy scores in each 
of these 4 dimensions. 
The 8 resulting scores 
range from 0 (no 
fragility) to 3 (high 
fragility) and are 
summed to produce an 
overall fragility score for 
over 160 developed and 
developing countries. 
2x4 matrix of indicators 
(effectiveness and 
legitimacy indicators for 
security, governance, 
economic, and social 
dimensions of state 
performance) and 
composite indices of 
legitimacy, effectiveness 
and state fragility 










x     x x  x   x x 
12 economic, political, 
and social indicators. 





















x  x  x x   x x x 
It ranks state according 
to their “risk of future 
civil conflict and 
instability” based on 
Political  Instability Task  
Force database and 
statistical correlation 
with instability events. 
160 countries 
* includes a survey of existing indices, that has been useful to build this table 
 
